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1 Introduction
1.1 Background
In 1986 the US Congress passed a comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act 
(Public Law 99-440, 22 USC 5001 et seq.) which included a ban of
all imports from South Africa of agricultural products, coal, 
iron and steel, and textiles and exports of oil, nuclear 
materials, and computers to "apartheid enforcing" agencies. In 
addition, Section 303 of the Act prohibits imports from South 
African concerns which are owned, controlled or subsidised by the 
government except for strategic minerals essential for the 
economy or defence of the USA which are unavailable from 
elsewhere.
In February 1987 the US Department of State "certified" ten such 
strategic minerals. These "certified minerals" are:
1 ) andalusite '
2) antimony
3) chrysotile asbestos
4) chromium and ferrochromium
5) cobalt
6) natural industrial diamonds
7) manganese and manganese alloys
8) platinum group minerals (PGM's)
9) rutile
10) vanadium
These minerals were deemed to be strategic using the following 
criteria:
a) that the lack of the mineral concerned would adversely 
affect the peacetime economy of the USA, the USA's 
competitiveness or defence,
b) that the mineral concerned was not available from in 
sufficient quantities from alternative reliable sources. In 
this regard the USSR and other European Eastern bloc states 
were excluded from consideration,
c) minerals for which other Southern African states were the 
main source, but which were deemed to be shipped via South 
Africa were also considered to be strategic.
1 .2 Approach
The approach of this paper is first to review the validity for 
inclusion of the ten "certified minerals" using the State 
Department's criteria. Second to make a case for the development 
of these minerals in the other states of southern Africa.
In the debate surrounding the sanctions issue an aspect often 
overlooked is aid to the neighbours of South Africa. We call 
this "positive sanctions" whereby sanctions against the South 
African apartheid regime are linked to positive action to develop 
alternative supplies of these strategic minerals from other 
countries in the region, particularly the Frontline States.
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The concept of positive sanctions would mean that the reduced 
supply of minerals brought about by sanctions against the RSA 
would be compensated for by the development of these minerals in 
the other states of the region. As the geology of these states is 
similar, several minerals for which the RSA is a major producer 
also occur in the surrounding countries. This strategy not only 
guarantees the US supplies of minerals embargoed from South 
Africa, but also would go some way to regaining the US's 
credibility in the region after a decade of the Reagan 
doctrine of collaboration and support for South Africa 
("constructive engagement"), even to the extent of joining the 
Apartheid regime in the destabilisation of neighbouring states.
In 1986 the loss to the southern African mining industries due to 
South African destabilisation was estimated at 4.5 GUS$ and 
mining in some of the countries had all but ceased due to South 
African sponsored banditry (Jourdan: 1986a). A policy of positive 
sanctions would therefore not only aid the South African people 
in their struggle against the Apartheid regime, but would also 
help the Frontline states to bolster their economies against 
future South African onslaughts.
The reasons for the US to diversify its mineral supply sources 
away from South Africa, should not only be seen in terms of 
sanctions, but also that it makes good business sense not to be 
too dependent on any one source, particularly if that source is 
likely to experience escalating internal civil strife in the near 
to medium future.
In arguing the case for alternative sources and the development 
of other southern African deposits, this paper is in fact arguing 
for the inclusion of these minerals under the total ban as with 
steel and coal, not just if the South African producer is owned, 
controlled or subsidised by the Apartheid regime.
Alternative sources are considered at two levels: actual, where 
the exploitation of mineral deposits is already underway and 
potential, where alternative deposits still need to be developed, 
particularly suitable southern African deposits. In this regard 
the validity of the third criteria will be assessed.
This paper does not investigate the first criteria, that the 
certified minerals are vital to the peacetime US economy and 
defence. Rather we only consider alternative sources of supply.
Finally, this paper is to some extent in response to the paper 
compiled by the US General Accounting Office entitled "Strategic 
Minerals: Extent of US Reliance on South Africa" of June 1988 
requested by Senators Messrs. Kennedy and Weiker (GAO: 1988).
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2.1 Overview
The inclusion of several of the ten minerals using the stated 
criteria is blatantly ludicrous and leads one to believe that the 
Apartheid Regime has significant support in the State Department, 
as their inclusion makes very little sense when one explores the 
alternative sources of supply and the level of US imports.
For this reason the certified minerals have been divided into two 
groups. The first group includes those minerals for which there 
are reasonable and secure alternative sources of supply and 
include natural industrial diamonds, antimony, cobalt, manganese, 
rutile, vanadium, chrysotile asbestos and alumino-silicates 
(andalusite, sillimanite and kyanite).
The second group includes those minerals for which there would 
be difficulty in securing alternative operating sources, but some 
occur in the southern African region outside South Africa and 
need to be developed. These include chromite and ferrochrome and 
the platinum group minerals (PGM's).
2 The "Certified Minerals"
2.2 Minerals with Actual Alternative Sources
2.2.1 Industrial Diamonds
The most obvious non-strategic mineral for the USA in terms of 
South African supply are natural industrial diamonds. According 
to the US Bureau of Mines, in 1987 the US imported 48.6 million 
carats of industrial diamonds (natural and synthetic) for 
consumption of which less than 0.5% came directly from South 
Africa (GAO: 1988), though some South African production could 
have been imported via intermediate countries such as Ireland. 
The main diamond producers in 1986 were Australia, Zaire, 
Botswana, the USSR and South Africa, in that order (Table 1). In 
addition almost all of Australia's, Zaire's and the USSR's output 
is industrial grade while Botswana and South Africa have a 
significant proportion of gem grade stones.
Table 1
World Diamond Production: 1986
Country Mcarats % World
x s s x c s s tx x e x x s SXSSS3SSSSS *5S58B SSS
Australia 29.2 3 32%
Zaire 23.30 25%
Botswana 13.14 14%
USSR 10.80 12%
South Africa 10.23 11%
Others 4.80 5%
TOTAL: 91 .50 100%
cssksessssss SBSSBBXSSBKSBSSBBSSB
Source: BGS: 1988
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The British Geological Survey (BGS) estimated that the US 
imported a total of 25.6 Mcarats in 1986 of natural diamonds of 
all types of which only 9 Mcarats were of industrial grade 
(Table 2).
Table 2
US Diamond Imports 1986 
Type Mcarats
Rough 1 .29
Cut 7.88
Industrial 8.95
Bort .25
Dust 7.26
TOTAL: 25.63
Source: BGS: 1988
a
What is clear is that South Africa does not constitute the only 
secure source of industrial diamonds outside the centrally 
planned economies. The main producer, Australia, is not only a 
secure source of supply, but also has almost half the world 
reserve base. The second largest producer, Zaire, is widely 
considered to be a client state of the US and should therefore be 
considered a secure source for that country.
It should also be borne in mind in this regard that, in case of a 
shortage, there are several US firms that produce synthetic 
industrial diamonds which could expand output to cater for at 
least part of the USA's natural diamond imports. Also, in 1986 
the US National Defence Stockpile of industrial diamonds stood at 
22 Mcarats of crushing bort (USBM: 1988).
The only other possible objective reason that the State 
Department might have had for including industrial diamonds in 
the list of certified minerals is the fact that a South African 
company, De Beers Consolidated Diamond Mines, has a virtual 
international diamond marketing monopoly via its subsidiary the 
Central Selling Organisation (CSO) in London. Given this 
situation, it is still highly improbable that the CSO would 
refuse to sell production from countries other than South Africa 
to the US if the US banned production from South Africa. Even if 
this highly unlikely event came to pass, other countries would 
most probably bypass the CSO and sell direct to US customers.
The GAO report mentions a specific type of industrial diamond 
(Type IIB) for which there is reportedly only one source from one 
mine, naturally in South Africa. It is further claimed that it 
"has a unique defence communication application" (GAO: 1988, 
p28). As no further details are given it is difficult to confirm 
whether or not there is a substitute for this application. 
Assuming that there is not, there appears to be no reason why 
the State Department did not exempt (certify) this specific type 
only, rather than their blanket exemption for all industrial 
diamonds.
USA-RSA Page 4
In the case of cobalt, inclusion on the certified list clearly 
does not come from South Africa's dominant position a producer. 
On the contrary the RSA contributed an insignificant proportion 
of world mine production of cobalt in 1986 (Table 3). The main 
producers in that year were Zaire, Zambia, Australia, the USSR 
and New Caledonia (France). In the same year South Africa 
imported 157 tonnes of cobalt metal and made no exports
(BGS: 1988).
2.2.2 Coba1t
Table 3
World Cobalt Production: 1986
Country ktonnes % %*
=re = = c = = = = = = = ESESfiSSSSCBS eesss = = = =
Zaire 14.26 45% —
Zambia 4.34 14% —
Australia 2.91 9% 23%
USSR 2.80 9% 22%
New Caledonia 1 .9? 6% 15%
Others 5.27 17% 41 %
TOTAL: 31 .50 1 00% 100%
CSSSSCSSZSSS5 SSSSSSSSSSS s = = e == s = s
* % excluding Zaire and Zambia 
Source: BGS: 1988
In terms of reserves, in 1983 the IMM estimated that Zaire had 
30% of the world's cobalt resource base, New Caledonia 18%, the 
USSR 14% and did not consider South Africa's resources worth 
mentioning (IMM: 1983).
Inclusion of this mineral on the certified mineral list must 
clearly come from the third criteria: that a significant
proportion of world output is shipped via South Africa. Only 
Zaire's and Zambia's production, 61% of world output in 1986, 
could possibly be shipped via South Africa. US imports of cobalt 
in 1986 were estimated at 5.5 ktonnes by the BGS and 5.3 ktonnes 
by the USBM (BGS: 1988 & USBM: 1988). These estimates would 
constitute around 17% of world production in 1986 and in terms of 
world output excluding Zaire and Zambia the percentage would be 
43%.
Although the majority of world production comes from Zaire and 
Zambia, it does not therefore follow that all exports from these 
two countries must necessarily go via South Africa. Figure 1 
gives the main transport routes in the southern African region. 
There are five principle routes for copper and cobalt exports 
from the Zaire-Zambia Copperbelt:
1 ) Via Ileibo to the port of Matadi (Zaire)
2) Via the Benguela line to Lobito (Angola)
3) Via the Tazara line to Dar es Salaam (Tanzania)
4) Via Zimbabwe to Beira and Maputo (Mozambique)
5) Via Zimbabwe and Botswana to the South African ports
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Historically the principal routes were primarily the Benguela 
line to Lobito Bay in Angola a^ nd secondly via Zimbabwe to the 
Mozambican port of Beira and later, Maputo. Since the 
independence of Angola in 1975 the Benguela route has been out of 
action due to the destabilisation policies of South Africa in 
collusion with the US.
Under normal circumstances the Benguela line would be the 
cheapest and quickest route to the coast (see Jourdan: 1986a). 
The US State Department's Assistant Secretary of State for 
African Affairs, Chester Crocker, recently (August, 1988) 
reaffirmed his government's commitment to the destabilisation of 
Angola despite the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola 
and South Africa's agreement to finally comply with UN resolution 
435 of 1975 to withdraw its occupying forces from Namibia and 
allow democratic elections under UN supervision.
It would appear somewhat strange that the US State Department 
itself is keeping an important cobalt export route closed then 
turning around and saying that cobalt should be on the list of 
certified minerals because of its own actions. But, even without 
the Benguela line operational, it would be ridiculous to assume 
that less than 20 ktonnes/annum of cobalt could not be exported 
via the Tazara line to Dar es Salaam, via Zimbabwe to the port of 
Beira, or via Ilebo to Matadi. In 1986 the port of Dar es Salaam 
handled 84% of Zambia's total metal exports of half a million 
tonnes of copper, zinc, lead and cobalt, and Beira accounted for 
9% (Memaco: 1987).
2.2.3 Andalusite
Andalusite is an alumino-silicate together with kyanite and 
sillimanite. Their main use is in the manufacture of refactory 
(heat resistant) bricks for metallurgical furnaces. Why the State 
Department specifically listed andalusite is unclear as all three 
alumino-silicates are converted to mullite, the form used in 
refractories. Both andalusite and sillimanite are imported by the 
US from South Africa. The US is the world's largest producer of 
kyanite and also has substantial production of synthetic mullite 
made from alumina and silica. Production of synthetic mullite in 
the US was about 25 ktonnes in 1985 (USBM: 1988).
World production figures for the alumino-silicates are difficult 
to come by. South Africa, France, the US, India and Sweden are 
producers. The South African Chamber of Mines claims that in 
1986 South Africa had 47% of the "Western Worlds" 
alumino-silicate reserve base (SACM: 1987). The US itself has an 
adequate reserve base of kyanite estimated at 30 Mtonnes and has 
sufficient capacity for the production of synthetic mullite for 
the end-uses where kyanite is unsuitable (USBM: 1986). Thus it is 
unclear why South African alumino-silicates are included on the 
prescribed minerals list.
!i There are several deposits of alumino-silicates in the other
| states of southern Africa. If the US considers that its import
I exposure to South Africa is unacceptable high, then these
i deposits should be considered as potential alternative supply 
I sources. The Zimbabwean Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC) is 
| currently developing its kyanite property, Ky Mine, and would 
certainly be interested in sales to the US.
2.2.4 Chrysotile Asbestos
Of all the minerals on the certified list, the logic behind the 
inclusion of chrysotile asbestos is the most baffling as the US's 
neighbour and ally, Canada, is far and away the western world's 
largest producer. In 1986 Canada produced 69% of western world 
output of 955 ktonnes and South Africa produced 10% (Table 4). In 
the same year the US imported 102 ktonnes of chrysotile asbestos 
of which less than one ktonne came from South Africa and 99% came 
from Canada (USBM: 1988).
Table 4 
Western World 
Chrysotile Output: 1986
Country Ktonnes %
Canada 662 69%
Zimbabwe 164 17%
South Africa 91 10%
Swaziland 21 2%
Cyprus 13 1%
Japan 4 -
TOTAL: 955 100%
Source: BGS:
e s s s c c c s s s s s s
1988
Appendix III of the 1988 GAO Report claims that "a particular 
strategic grade of chrysotile", used in missile and submarine 
construction, is mined in Zimbabwe and Shipped through South 
Africa (GAO: 1988, p28). If in fact all of 600,000 tonnes of
Canadian production is unsuitable for these uses and only the 
Zimbabwean product is appropriate it must be an extremely small 
amount as, from 1985 to 1987, neither the US Bureau of Mines nor 
the Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe (MMCZ), which 
markets all of the Zimbabwean product, registered US imports of' 
asbestos from Zimbabwe (USBM: 1988 & MMCZ: 1988). In addition the 
MMCZ exports about 50 ktonnes/annum in containers via Beira and 
any US demand could easily be met using this export route 
(MMCZ: 1988). There would therefore appear to be no objective 
reason for including chrysotile asbestos on the certified 
minerals list.
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2.2.5 Antimony
US imports for consumption of antimony in 1986 were 23 Ktonnes 
most of which came from China and in the same year GSA stocks 
stood at 34 ktonnes (USBM: 1988). Imports of this amount could 
clearly be supplied by non-Comecon countries, excluding South 
Africa, which produced 41.6 ktonnes of antimony in 1986 
(Table 5). As the South African product is not of a special grade 
or quality the reasoning behind this metal's inclusion on the 
prescribed list remains illusive.
Table 5
World Antimony Production: 1986
Country ktonnes . % %*
China 14.00 25% 29%
Bolivia 10.24 19% 21%
South Africa 6.82 12% 14%
USSR 6.00 11 % —
Canada 3.81 7% 8%
Mexico 3.34' 6% 7%
Guatamala 2.02 4% 4%
Turkey 1 .99 4% 4%
Thailand 1 .26 2% 3%
Australia 1 .13 2% 2%
Others 4.59 8% 8%
TOTAL: 55.20 1 00% 100%
* excluding COMECON countries. 
Source: BGS: 1988
There are several potential antimony sources in the rest of the 
southern African region and two mines are in operation in 
Zimbabwe (Indarama and Belingwe Star). If the US seriously wanted 
to develop new alternative sources, an appraisal of other 
southern African deposits could be a fruitful starting point.
2.2.6 Manganese
In 1986 South Africa produced 26% of the world's non-Comecon 
manganese ore (Table 6) and its exports to the US amounted to 
13 kt, manganese content (USBM: 1988). The bulk of US ore imports 
came from Gabon 53%, Brazil 17% and Australia 16% 
(USBM: 1988). US imports from South Africa of ferromanganese and 
silicomanganese together were 156 ktonnes of contained manganese 
representing 39% of total imports of these two alloys. In 
addition, in 1986, the US also imported from the RSA small 
quantities of manganese metal (9 kt) and manganese dioxide (3 kt) 
(USBM: 1988).
US dependence on South African supplies is minor for all types of 
manganese except for ferromanganese for which it represented 36% 
of imports in 1986, but as many of the smelters in the OECD 
countries are running at under capacity (particularly in the 
USA), this quantity could fairly easily be made up by them if the
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US were to ban imports of South African manganese. The main South 
African producer Samancor was privitised in 1986 when it was 
fought from the Apartheid state by the Afrikaner mining houseGencor.
Table 6
Manganese Ore Output: 1986
Country kt % %*
c=r==sz=rs:
USSR 9300 39% —
RSA 3719 15% 26%
Brazil 2700 11% 19%
Gabon 2513 10% 17%
Australia 1649 7% 11%
China 1600 7% 11%
India 127 5 5% 9%
Others 1244 5% 7%
TOTAL: 24000 100% 100%
* excluding Comecon states 
Source: BGS: 1988.
There are several manganese deposits in the rest of southern 
Africa, but the only one in operation is in southern Zaire just 
off the Benguela railway line (Kisenga), but it is having 
problems exporting its ore to Lobito Bay due to Apartheid and US 
sponsored sabotage of the line in Angola. Therefore one positive 
way of eliminating South African ore imports would be for the US 
to cease aiding the Unita rebels in Angola. In addition both 
Zambia (Mwanza) and Angola (Kiaponte and Kitota) have in the past 
produced manganese and these deposits could be reassessed in this 
regard (see Jourdan: 1986c).
2.2.7 Rutile (and Ti slag)
Rutile is one of the main titanium ore minerals, the others 
being illmenite and leucoxene. Why specifically rutile was 
included on the certified list and not the other titanium 
minerals, remains a mystery. The world's main sources of titanium 
are Canada (slag) and Australia (Ti minerals). South Africa is a 
relatively small producer and in 1986 the titanium content of 
its mineral and slag production was but 11% of the world total 
(BGS: 1988). In that year US imports from South Africa were only 
significant for slag (Table 7), but these could easily be 
substituted for by other countries. Not only does but one-fifth 
of US rutile imports come from South Africa, but this mineral is 
also produced synthetically in several countries, including the 
US (Table 7).
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US Titanium Imports: 1986
Source ,kt % RSA
ss==ssssscs=ss I'SSSSSS: = sss:ss
Ilmenite 426 0%
Ti Slag 328 46%
Rutile 159 21%
Ti02 pigments 184 <1%
Ti sponge 1 .5 0%
Ti metal 0.1 0%
Ti scrap 2.2 0%
Ti wrought 1.1 0%
Source: USBM: 1988
Several other states in southern Africa have significant reserves 
of titanium minerals in beach sand deposits on the coasts of both 
Mozambique and Tanzania and along the lake shore of Lake Malawi- 
/Niassa/Nyasa. A recent UN Revolving Fund for Natural Resources 
Exploration study of the region isolated these deposits as 
warranting further investigation for commercial exploitation 
(UNRF: 1988). Resources of heavy mineral sands in Mozambique 
have been estimated at 118 Mt containing 3.5 to 5% heavy 
minerals (Jourdan: 1986b). Estimates put Tanzanian resources of 
heavy mineral sands at around 50 Mt (UNRF: 1988).
2.2.8 Vanadium
Vanadium is mainly used in special steels and alloys. A tiny 
amount is used by the chemical and ceramic industries. It is 
generally traded as vanadium pentoxide the main feed for 
ferrovanadium production.
Vanadium is seldom mined as such, it is usually a byproduct or 
coproduct of iron/steel making, uranium processing or 
phosphorous production. In addition it is also recovered from 
petroleum residues, clays and spent catalysts. Thus actual 
primary mine production of vanadium is low compared to the amount 
generated by other processes.
In 1986 the US imported for its own consumption a mere 
1.3 ktonnes of ferrovanadium containing about one thousand 
tonnes of vanadium, mainly from Canada (36%) and Austria (21%), 
South Africa (20%) and West Germany (17%) (USBM: 1988). In the 
same year the US's imports of vanadium pentoxide for its own 
consumption was 374 tons of contained vanadium of which 
two-thirds came from South Africa (USBM: 1988). Thus total 
imports of contained vanadium were 1,452 tonnes constituting 37% 
of consumption (3.9 ktons). South African imports therefore 
constituted only 9% of US consumption.
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Table 9
Production of Vanadium: 1986
Country ktonnes %
= = = = = = = = ==: = = =sssssssesss
South Africa 15.6 45%
USSR 9.6 27%
China 4.5 13%
US 4.5* 13%
Japan 0.8* 2%
TOTAL: 35.0 100%
* includes secondary recovery 
Source: USBM: 1988
Although South Africa is the main world producer of vanadium 
(Table 9), the US is also a significant producer, both from mine 
production and from secondary recovery from petroleum residues, 
ashes and spent catalysts. The US's dependence on imports in 
general and South African imports in particular is thus low and 
there is therefore*^ strong argument as to why South African 
supplies of this commodity should be included on the list of 
certified minerals.
2.3 Minerals with Potential Alternative Sources 
2.3.1 Chromite & Ferrochrome
In this section we deal with the second group of minerals where 
the case for exemption is arguable, in; other words where South 
Africa's share of non-Comecon output and trade is considerable. 
The best known case is that of chromite and ferrochrome where in
1986 the RSA mined 52% of non-socialist output of the former
smelted 41% of the latter (Table 8)i.
Table 8
NSW* Chromite and Ferrochrome Production: 1986
Chromite Ferrochrome
Country kt % Country kt %
South Africa 3453 52% South Africa 915 41%
India 630 9% Japan 310 14%
Turkey 600 9% Zimbabwe 190 8%
Finland 590 9% Finland 134 6%
Zimbabwe 553 8% Brazil 120 5%
Brazil 270 4% Sweden 105 5%
Philippines 180 3% India 95 4%
Madagascar 110 2% Yugoslavia 75 3%
Others 249 4% Others 296 13%
TOTAL: 6635 100% TOTAL: 2240 100%
CBCtBCBEBBJlCKSItlBIII BeSCBBVSIBICeiBBBBBBM B E C K S Ks tsmm
*NSW Non-socialist world. Source: SLH: 1988
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jo 1986 the US imported 443 kt of chromite of which 145 kt (34%) 
came from South Africa. In the same year 352 kt of ferrochrome 
were imported of which 209 kt (59%) came from South Africa 
(USBM: 1988). This level of dependence would admittedly be 
difficult to drop without any cost to the US consumers. The US 
could at a pinch be supplied by other producers, but this would 
push the price of their product up as there would be a reduced 
supply base. Conversely though, it would push the price of the 
South African product down as it would then have a reduced 
market. As the South African charge chrome is not of a high 
grade, US consumers should have no major problems regarding 
quality when switching to alternative suppliers.
Although the RSA has the bulk of the World's high iron chromite 
reserves (90%), most of the high chromium reserves are next door 
in Zimbabwe (84%) which are estimated at 560 Mt but could be well 
over 1 Gt and its resource base is put at three to ten billion 
tons (Slatter: 1981). The lower figure represents 80 years of 
world supply at current consumption rates, longer than even the 
most pessimistic predictions of the time left for the Apartheid 
regime in South Africa.
This mineral therefore could provide the US with an ideal 
opportunity for applying positive sanctions whereby the embargo 
of supplies from the Apartheid regime is compensated for by 
developing alternative capacity in the Frontline States who are 
already experiencing various forms of South African 
destabilisation and aggression (see Hanlon: 1986, Martin: 1986 
and Jourdan: 1986b).
American consumption of South African ferrochrome could easily 
be substituted for by doubling Zimbabwean smelter capacity. A 
USBM report estimated Zimbabwean chromite mining capacity to be 
around 1 Mt/an which would be enough to maintain present 
ferrochrome output and take on the US's current supplies from 
South Africa (USBM: 1981). In addition Zimbabwe's neighbours 
(Zambia and Mozambique) have a huge excess capacity of extremely 
cheap hydro power available for the ferrochrome smelting process 
and one (Mozambique) has the necessary grade of coking coal for 
the reductant. Thus this sanctions/expansion project would end 
up benefiting several of the Apartheid regime's regional victims.
The US's chromite imports from South Africa could fairly easily 
be met by suppliers round the world marginally increasing output 
(less than 10%) or by the US importing more ferrochrome rather 
than chromite.
2.3.2 The Platinum Group Metals
The principal economic platinum group metals are platinum, 
palladium and rhodium and the minor ones are iridium, osmium and 
ruthenium. South African mines dominate the production of 
platinum and in 1986 they produced 83% of Western world supply 
(Table 9). Their production of palladium is second only to that 
of the Soviet Union (Table 9) and they produce most of the 
world's rhodium (JM: 1988).
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Table 9
PLATINUM AND PALLADIUM SUPPLY: 1986 
Platinum Palladium
Country kg % Country kg %
South Africa 73094 83%
USSR sales 9020 1 0%
Canada 4666 5%
Japan 663 1%
Others 588 1%
TOTAL: 88031 1 00%
Sources: JM: 1988, USBM: 1
USSR sales 49766 55%
South Africa 32348 36%
Canada 5910 7%
Japan 1 453 2%
Others 1348 1%
TOTAL: 90825 100%
, BGS 1988
In 1986 the US imported 53.6 tonnes of platinum of which 68% came 
from South Africa, . 43.1 tonnes of palladium of which 38% came 
from South Africa and 5.6 tonnes of rhodium of which 55% came 
from South Africa (USBM: 1988). With regard to domestic US 
production, the new Stillwater operation which came into 
operation in 1987 is producing about 780 kg of platinum per annum 
and about 2.3 tonnes of palladium (USBM: 1988 & JM: 1988).
As with chromium, it would be extremely difficult for the US to 
replace South African supplies of the PGM's from the rest of the 
world excluding the USSR without adverse economic affects to the 
US consumers. But, like chromium, there are substantial resources 
of PGM's in the Great Dyke of Zimbabwe and a major PGM deposit 
has recently been discovered in Botswana.
The Zimbabwean resources have been put at 1.7 billion tonnes 
containing 5.45 g/t PGM's and gold plus 0.2% nickel and. 0.15% 
copper (Bohmke: 1981). Of the 5.45 g/t PGM's plus gold, 45% is 
platinum, 32% is palladium, 14%.is gold, 4% is rhodium and 5% are 
the other PGM's (Bohmke: 1981).
This resource base is clearly adequate for Zimbabwe to become a 
medium-sized producer, which, together with US output 
(Stillwater) and production from the rest of the world excluding 
the USSR, could replace US imports from the RSA. The Zimbabwean 
deposits are lower grade than the South African ones and at 
current prices are marginal, but if a progressive embargo was 
imposed of, for instance, a 10% reduction of South African 
imports per year, as the Zimbabwean deposits were being 
developed, then there would be an increase in the world market 
prices for non-RSA or "clean" PGM's which would guarantee the 
profitability of the Zimbabwean operations.
As the PGM's would be airfreighted to the customers, any problems 
raised by the State Department regarding transportation through 
South Africa would not apply.
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The PGM deposit in Botswana is located in the south of the 
country near the Molopo River on the South African border. The 
formation is geologically similar to the Bushvelt Igneous Complex 
in the RSA which contains the majority of world PGM reserves. 
Detailed assessment of the deposit has still to be done.
This strategy of positive sanctions, might in the case of the 
PGM1 2s , entail a certain cost to the USA, in that the development 
of the alternative deposits would most probably require cheap 
initial finance with a low interest rate, which could be in the 
form of a loan from the US state. It would be foolhardy to 
contemplate that the eradication of Apartheid will not cost the 
US anything.
3 Conclusion
This paper has reviewed the ten minerals on the State 
Department's list of "certified minerals". The review has 
attempted to assess whether or not* the US does indeed need to get 
these minerals from or through South Africa and also considered 
alternative source in the southern African region excluding South 
Africa. The following conclusions were reached:
a) For most of the ten minerals there are currently sources of 
supply other than the RSA. There are six of these:
1 ) andalusite (alumino-silicates)
2) antimony
3) industrial diamonds
4) manganese
5) rutile (titanium minerals)
6) vanadium
b) Even though there are alternative, operating, sources of 
supply for these six minerals, if the US still wanted to 
reduce there import exposure to the RSA, the southern African 
region had alternative resources which could be developed (or 
expanded) of the following minerals:
1 ) alumino-silicates (Zimbabwe)
2) antimony (Zimbabwe)
3) industrial diamonds (Angola and Zaire)
4) manganese (Zaire, Zambia and Angola)
5) titanium minerals (Mozambique, Tanzania, Malawi)
c) For minerals not produced in South Africa, but which were 
included as it was claimed that US imports were routed through 
South Africa, it was concluded that there were several other 
operating routes other than via South Africa that could be 
used. There were two such minerals:
1) cobalt (from Zaire and/or Zambia)
2) chrysotile asbestos (from Zimbabwe)
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d) For two minerals it was concluded that currently 
alternative suppliers ' could not meet US demand but there 
existed potential alternative sources within the southern 
African region. The minerals were:
1) chromite and ferrochrome (Zimbabwe)
2) the platinum group metals (Zimbabwe and Botswana)
e) With regard to chromite and the PGM's it was concluded that 
"positive sanctions" should be applied by the US whereby 
alternative sources in the Frontline States should be 
developed to compensate for South African supplies. It was 
suggested that the US should progressively reduce its South 
African imports of chromite, ferrochrome and the PGM's while 
developing these deposits in Zimbabwe and, in the case of 
PGM's, Botswana.
f) Finally, if the US were to embargo all of the certified 
minerals except for chromite, ferrochrome and the PGM's the 
extra cost to the US of switching suppliers would be 
negligible. If a progressive embargo was applied for chromite, 
ferrochrome and the PGM's while alternative sources were being 
developed, it was concluded that the extra cost to the US 
would also be extremely low.
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